Archive for category Hospital

System Resilience: Where are the points in your system where a single bad decision by a single person can affect outcome?

Been thinking about this concept today when trying to figure out where you spend your time and resources to harden your system. At least in medicine, in most processes, it’s a team sport. In those instances, it is unlikely that a single bad decision by a single person will go unnoticed and uncorrected. For example, if you post a patient for surgery who is far too sick to survive the operation. In academic medicine, the resident will see the patient and will likely ask you to explain why the patient needs the operation. Then the pre-op center (which almost every hospital has in one form or another) will evaluate the patient and throw a flag. Then even if they get by that, on the day of surgery the patient will be seen by a pre-op nurse and an anesthesiologist,who all can stop the process. Finally there is the operative team and the time out as final checks before you proceed.

Even in emergency surgery, there is an Emergency Medicine physician, anesthesiologist, and surgical team laying eyes and hands on the patient who can stop a bad decision. In the course of an operation, a single person can certainly cut the wrong thing and cause problems, but as far as cutting something and no one noticing, it is possible, but unlikely. If you cause bleeding, everyone will notice, if you do something else, your surgical assistant will notice, the scrub nurse or tech, and possibly the anesthesiologist, not to mention all the post-op care the patient will receive where it can be discovered.

So when you look at our systems, there are really only a few places where a single error by a single person can resonate, and that is at off hours when staffing is low. In those cases a single nurse or respiratory therapist could be caring for more patients than during the day, and could gloss over significant findings. Since there is no one checking after them until the morning, the error can propagate. An on-call physician can also make a serious error, but there is the safety measure of a nurse at the bedside that can protect the patient from the error, and an escalation of care system that can bring more senior people to the bedside to re-evaluate. That is why empowering the nurse to speak up, and empowering everyone to call for more help is vital.

As I’ve said before, the difference between medicine and other high reliability industries is medicine’s proclivity for putting people alone into high risk situations. Fire has the company officer always backing up the firefighter, the military always has the corporal and sergeant, and aviation (in most cases) has a co-pilot and avionics to alarm and intervene. In medicine we need to get back the experienced charge nurse whose only duty is to look out for the safety of their patients, and set tripwires for problems where if the data is consistently abnormal, the information is spread across the providers wide enough to insure that an adequate response occurs.

What is Logical Risk Assessment and What is Paranoia?

A discussion with examples of high risk, medium risk, and low risk situations and how we deal with them. How do we set up systems that manage risk, without wasting resources and time. The sound effects are my dogs, Deci and Yogi.  Thanks for listening. JY

Why we need a bedside ICS

A discussion of the significant need for a tool to organize routine clinical incidents. A little sax section work at the beginning and end. Thanks for listening. JY

Weak Signals and Managing the Unexpected

A discussion of Weick and Sutcliffe’s principles from “Managing the Unexpected” and how they relate to how we design safe systems in whatever we do. Thanks for listening. JY.

Entropy or Why It’s So Hard to Get People to Follow Guidelines

A discussion of why it is so hard to get smart people to control what they do. There is a tremendous pressure toward disorder in the universe, and among physicians, firefighters, and others. It’s one reason why you need to watch what you say around the “kids”.

Chameleon at the beginning and end with Brian Hughley on drums and myself on sax.

Thanks. JY

Transforming Clinical Operations: Lessons from Firefighting Part 2

Second half of my talk. Thanks for listening. JY

Transforming Clinical Operations: Lessons From Firefighting Part 1

This is the first part of my Grand Rounds lecture from August 21 on what we need to change in hospital medicine and what we can learn from how firefighting has improved safety and decreased line of duty deaths. Part 2 next week. Thanks for listening. JY

The Future of Paramedicine Part 2

Continuation of the discussion with Tom Joyce about the future of Paramedicine. Thanks for listening. JY

The Future of Paramedicine: Part 1

Tom Joyce and I discuss the future of paramedics in the rapidly changing health care environment. This is part 1 and ends around the 22 minute mark with some music.  Thanks for listening. JY

Too much safety?

I realize I am coming to this late, but I just listened to and read about the speech by LT Ray McCormack at FDIC several years ago talking about the safety culture and its detrimental effect on firefighting. I will once again stress I am not a firefighter but I am someone who has worked for 20 years to improve safety and decrease error.

The fundamental friction between the safety culture and experienced clinicians or firefighters is the fact that our process for improving safety is often increasing regimentation, decreasing variability, and standardizing investigations and operations. This is painful for experienced people to deal with, because they have done things by experience and gut feeling for years, often very successfully. Adding these safety processes can slow down operations, increases the number of steps you pass through in carrying out a plan, and in our case increases paperwork, all without adding much value, in the eyes of the experienced and competent provider. For someone who has done a heroic job of teaching people how to do things by applying their own large amount of experience, this is viewed as a waste of time. What I believe the LTs point was that these processes add time without adding value. If you don’t have time to spare, that wasted time could be the difference between carrying out a procedure successfully, or not.

But I would put forward my justification for safety processes. First, people forget things, especially in high stress situations of low frequency. There is no way to insure they remember that safety step 100% of the time other than through procedures. For the person who would never think of not taking that step, the checklist is idiotic. Unfortunately that person isn’t always the person we are trying to protect and we have to design our systems so the most inexperienced and dumb person will do the right thing 100% of the time. All it takes is one miss to cause a catastrophic outcome and that fact has been proven over and over.

What I tell people to do is view the safety procedures as part of carrying out the job, not some add on that is a burden. Stop investing emotions in fighting these safety processes, just learn them, do they efficiently, and move on. They are mostly double checks and are only verifying that you didn’t forget something and when you look at it dispassionately, the amount of time actually added by safety processes is small but the return on that time investment can be large.

Instead use your experience to adapt and revise the safety procedures to be more effective. Improve the education process so young firefighters, nurses, medics, and doctors don’t just learn checklists and mind-numbing routines, but learn WHY we are doing these things. My partner Dr Calland recently said that we should name every page in our guideline and safety manual after the patient whose care prompted the guidelines creation. As in firefighting, many of our guidelines grew from clinical errors and oversights and were built to prevent a recurrence of that problem in the future. We shouldn’t build guidelines and checklists out of every bad outcome, but we should examine every bad outcome to see if our present safety processes are sufficient.